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SoK: Making Sense of Censorship Resistance Systems
Abstract: An increasing number of countries implement
Internet censorship at different scales and for a variety of
reasons. Several censorship resistance systems (CRSs) have
emerged to help bypass such blocks. The diversity of the cen-
sor’s attack landscape has led to an arms race, leading to a
dramatic speed of evolution of CRSs. The inherent complex-
ity of CRSs and the breadth of work in this area makes it hard
to contextualize the censor’s capabilities and censorship re-
sistance strategies. To address these challenges, we conducted
a comprehensive survey of CRSs—deployed tools as well as
those discussed in academic literature—to systematize censor-
ship resistance systems by their threat model and correspond-
ing defenses. To this end, we first sketch a comprehensive at-
tack model to set out the censor’s capabilities, coupled with
discussion on the scope of censorship, and the dynamics that
influence the censor’s decision. Next, we present an evalua-
tion framework to systematize censorship resistance systems
by their security, privacy, performance and deployability prop-
erties, and show how these systems map to the attack model.
We do this for each of the functional phases that we identify
for censorship resistance systems: communication establish-
ment, which involves distribution and retrieval of information
necessary for a client to join the censorship resistance system;
and conversation, where actual exchange of information takes
place. Our evaluation leads us to identify gaps in the literature,
question the assumptions at play, and explore possible mitiga-
tions.
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1 Introduction
The importance of online communication for political free-
dom, social change and commerce continues to grow; for ex-
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ample, recent history suggests that the events of the Arab
Spring were in part spurred by the ability of revolutionaries to
mobilize and organize the population through the use of social
networking tools [1, 2]. Consequently, various actors (partic-
ularly nation states) have resorted to censor communications
which are considered undesirable, with more than 60 countries
around the world engaging in some form of censorship [3].
To evade such blocks, numerous censorship resistance systems
(CRSs) have been developed with the aim of providing unfet-
tered access to information, and to protect the integrity and
availability of published documents. Due to the diversity of
censorship mechanisms across different jurisdictions and their
evolution over time, there is no one approach which is opti-
mally efficient and resistant to all censors. Consequently, an
arms race has developed resulting in the evolution of censor-
ship resistance systems to have dramatically sped up. This has
resulted in a lack of broad perspective on capabilities of the
censor, approaches to censorship resistance, and the overarch-
ing trends and gaps in the field.
While a couple of surveys on this topic have emerged in
recent years, these appear to trade-off between being compre-
hensive [4] and rigorous [5], or have different goals (e.g. ana-
lyzing how threat models employed in CRS evaluations relate
to the behaviour of real censors as documented in field reports
and bug tickets [6]). We systematize knowledge of censorship
techniques and censorship resistance systems, with the goal to
capture both the breadth and depth of this area. Our goal is
to leverage this view to find common threads in CRSs, how
to evaluate these, how do these relate to the censor’s attack
capabilities, and identify a list of research gaps that should
be considered in future research. Our study is motivated by
two observations. First, CRSs tend to employ disparate threat
models, which makes it hard to assess the scope of circum-
vention offered by the system in isolation as well as in com-
parison with others. Secondly, CRSs have diverse goals which
they meet by employing various metrics; it is difficult to dis-
cern how these metrics fit into broad CRS functionality, and to
what effect.
We conduct a comprehensive survey of 73 censorship re-
sistance systems, including deployed systems and those de-
scribed in academic literature. We consolidate the threat mod-
els employed in these systems, to develop a single, compre-
hensive model of censor capabilities (Section 2). We augment
this model with an abstract model of censorship that explains
the extrinsic factors that may deter the censor from block-
ing even when it has the technical resources to do so. Turn-
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ing to censorship resistance, we first define a censorship re-
sistance system as full-blown software involving interaction
between various components, and having two-step functional-
ity (Section 3). Next from our survey of CRSs, we extract CRS
schemes based on recurring themes and underlying concepts.
We then establish a set of definitions to describe CRSs in terms
of their security, privacy, performance and deployability prop-
erties (Section 4). Finally, we apply this framework to evaluate
CRS schemes by their functional phases, and discuss strengths
and limitations of various schemes (Sections 5 and 6). We con-
clude by laying out a set of overarching research gaps and
challenges to inform future efforts (Section 7). To summarize
our key contributions, we (i) present a comprehensive censor-
ship attack model; (ii) provide a definition of a censorship re-
sistance system in terms of its components and functionality;
(iii) establish a CRS evaluation framework based on a common
set of well-defined security, privacy, performance and deploy-
ability properties; (iv) identify broad schemes of censorship
resistance that succinctly represent the underlying concepts;
(v) conduct comparative evaluation of censorship resistance
schemes; and (vi) discuss research gaps and challenges for the
community to consider in future research endeavours.
2 Internet Censorship
A censorship resistance systems (CRS) is meant for informa-
tion exchange between a user and a publisher that are con-
nected by a communication channel in the face of a censor
who actively attempts to prevent this communication. A cen-
sor’s goal is to disrupt information exchange over a target sys-
tem, by attacking the information itself (through corruption,
insertion of false information, deletion or modification), or by
impairing access to, or publication of, information (Figure 1).
2.1 Censorship Distinguishers
A censor’s decision is aided by distinguishers which are com-
posed of feature and value pairs. A feature is an attribute, such
as an IP address, protocol signature, or packet size distribu-
tion, with an associated value that can be a singleton, list, or
a range. In general, values are specified by a distribution on
the set of all possible values that the feature can take. Where
this distribution is sufficiently unique, feature-value pairs can
be used as a distinguisher to detect prohibited activities. For
example, a prevalence of 586-byte packet lengths forms a dis-
tinguisher the censor can utilize to identify Tor traffic.
Distinguishers are high- or low-quality depending on if
they admit low or high error rates, respectively. Furthermore,
Fig. 1. A system meant for information exchange involves a user that
retrieves information from a publisher over a link that connects the two.
The censor’s goal is to disrupt information exchange either by corrupting
it, or by hindering its access or publication (indicated by red crosses in
the figure).
they can be low- or high-cost depending on if small or large
amounts of resources are required to utilize them. For the cen-
sor, high-quality, low-cost distinguishers are ideal. The pri-
mary source of distinguishers is network traffic between the
user and publisher, where feature-value pairs may correspond
to headers and payloads of protocols at various network lay-
ers, e.g. source and destination addresses in IP headers, or des-
tination ports and sequence numbers in the TCP header, or
TLS record content type in the TLS header. Packet payloads,
if unencrypted, can also reveal forbidden keywords; the cen-
sor may act on such distinguishers without fear of collateral
damage since there is little uncertainty about the labelling of
these flows. Additionally, the censor can use the distinguishers
discussed above to develop models of allowed traffic, and dis-
rupt flows that deviate from normal. The censor can also col-
lect traffic statistics to determine distinguishers based on flow
characteristics, such as packet length and timing distributions.
2.2 Scope of Censorship
Censors vary widely with respect to their motivation, effec-
tiveness, and technical sophistication. A wide range of enti-
ties, from individuals to corporations to state-level actors, may
function as a censor. The extent to which a censor can effec-
tively disrupt a system is a consequence of that censor’s re-
sources and constraints. In particular, the censor’s technical
resources, capabilities, and goals are informed by its sphere of
influence and sphere of visibility. The sphere of influence is the
degree of active control the censor has over the flow of infor-
mation and behaviour of individuals and/or larger entities. The
sphere of visibility is the degree of passive visibility a censor
has over the flow of information on its own networks and those
of other operators.
The spheres of influence and visibility are dictated by
physical, political, or economic dynamics. Limitations due to
geography are an example of physical constraints, while rel-
evant legal doctrine, or international agreements and under-
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standings, which may limit the types of behaviour in which a
censor is legally allowed or willing to engage, are examples of
political limitations. Economic constraints assume the censor
operates within some specified budget which affects the tech-
nical sophistication and accuracy of the censorship apparatus
it can field.
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Fig. 2. Censorship apparatus model. The classifier takes as inputs the
set of network traffic to be analyzed, T , and the set of distinguishers, D,
and outputs a set O of traffic labels and the associated FNR and FPR,
denoted by Q. The cost function takes as inputs Q, together with the
censor’s tolerance for collateral damage (FPR) and information leakage
(FNR), denoted by A and B, respectively, and outputs a utility function,
U . B, and Q. The decision function takes O and U as inputs and outputs
a response R.
2.3 An Abstract Model of Censorship
At an abstract level, the censorship apparatus is composed of
classifier and cost functions that feed into a decision function
(Figure 2). Censorship activity can be categorized into two dis-
tinct phases: fingerprinting, and direct censorship.
In the first phase (fingerprinting), the censor identifies and
then uses a set of distinguishersD that can be used to flag pro-
hibited network activity. For example, the censor may employ
regular expressions to detect flows corresponding to a blocked
publisher. The classifier takes D and the set of network traf-
fic to be analyzed, T , as inputs, and outputs offending traffic
flows within some acceptable margin of error due to misclas-
sification. The censor’s error rates are the information leak-
age, or false negative rate (FNR), which is the rate at which
offending traffic is mislabeled as legitimate, and the false pos-
itive rate (FPR), which is the rate at which legitimate traffic is
mislabeled as offending, thus causing collateral damage. We
assume that the censor wants to minimize the FNR and FPR
within its given set of constraints.
In the second phase (direct censorship), the censor re-
sponds to flagged network flows, relying on a utility function
that accounts for the censor’s costs and tolerance for errors.
For example, the censor may choose to block flagged network
flows by sending TCP reset packets to both the user and pub-
lisher to force the connection to terminate.
2.4 Censor’s Attack Model
We now outline the attack surface available to the censor (il-
lustrated in Figure 3). This model expands the concepts of fin-
gerprinting and direct censorship from the abstract model of
censorship described in Section 2.3, grouping censorship ac-
tivities by where these take place (user, publisher, or the link
that connects these). Our attack model (and later systematiza-
tion in Section 4) is based on survey of 73 censorship resis-
tance systems, including deployed tools and academic papers:
we consolidated the threat models sketched in all the surveyed
systems to a single attack model described below.
2.4.1 Fingerprinting
Fingerprint Destinations. A flow can be associated with a
protocol based on distinguishers derived from the connection
tuple. Destination port is a typical target of censorship (e.g.
80 for HTTP). Flows addressed to IP addresses, hosts and do-
main names known to be associated with a blocked system can
be disrupted by implication. Flow fingerprinting of this kind
can form part of a multi-stage censorship policy, possibly fol-
lowed by a blocking step. Clayton examines the hybrid two-
stage censorship system CleanFeed deployed by British ISP,
BT. In the first stage, it redirects suspicious traffic (based on
destination IP and port) to an HTTP proxy. In the next stage, it
performs content filtering on the redirected traffic and returns
an error message if requested content is on the block list [7].
Fingerprint Content. Flows can be fingerprinted by check-
ing for the presence of protocol-specific strings, blacklisted
keywords, domain names and HTTP hosts. A number of DPI
boxes can perform regex-based traffic classification [8–11],
however it remains unclear what are the true costs of perform-
ing deep packet inspection (DPI) at scale [12, 13]. Alterna-
tively, flows can be fingerprinted based on some property of
the content being carried. For example, if the censor does not
allow encrypted content, it can use high entropy as a distin-
guisher to flag encrypted flows [14].
Fingerprint Flow Properties. The censor can fingerprint
a protocol by creating its statistical model based on flow-
based distinguishers such as packet length, and timing-related
features (inter-arrival times, burstiness etc.). Once a model
has been derived, the censor can fingerprint flows based on
their resemblance or deviation from this model [15, 16]. Wi-
ley [17] used Bayesian models created from sample traffic
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Fig. 3. Censor’s attack model, showing both direct censorship (information corruption, or disabling access or publication) and fingerprinting (to de-
velop and improve features for direct censorship). This figure does not include the relatively intangible attacks of coercion, denial of service, and
installation of censorship software on machines.
to fingerprint obfuscated protocols (Dust [18], SSL and obfs-
openssh [19]) based on flow features, and found that across
these protocols length and timing detectors achieved accuracy
of 16% and 89% respectively over entire packet streams, while
the entropy detector was 94% accurate using only the first
packet. A host’s transport layer behavior (e.g. the number of
outgoing connections) can be used for application classifica-
tion. Flow properties can also be used to fingerprint the web-
site a user is visiting even if the flow is encrypted [20–23].
Fingerprint Protocol Semantics. The censor can fingerprint
flows based on protocol behaviour triggered through differ-
ent kinds of active manipulation, i.e. by dropping, injecting,
modifying and delaying packets. The censor’s goal is to lever-
age knowledge of a protocol’s semantic properties to elicit
behaviour of a known protocol. Alternatively, a censor can
perform several fingerprinting cycles to elicit the informa-
tion on which to base subsequent blocking decision. In 2011,
Wilde [24] investigated how China blocked Tor bridges and
found that unpublished Tor bridges are first scanned and then
blocked by the Great Firewall of China (GFW). Wilde’s analy-
sis showed that bridges were blocked in the following fashion:
(i) When a Tor client within China connects to a Tor bridge or
relay, GFW’s DPI box flags the flow as a potential Tor flow,
(ii) random Chinese IP addresses then connect to the bridge
and try to establish a Tor connection; if it succeeds, the bridge
IP/port combination is blocked.
2.4.2 Direct Censorship
User Side Censorship. The censor can directly or discretely
(facilitated by malware or insider attacks) install censorship
software on user’s machine. This software can then disrupt
user’s access to information in various ways, for example by
disallowing unapproved software installation, disrupting func-
tionality of Internet searches by returning pruned results, and
displaying warnings to the user to dissuade them from attempt-
ing to seek, distribute, or use censored content. This kind of
censorship may lead to corruption of information as well as ac-
cess disruption. China’s Green Dam, a filtering software prod-
uct purported to prevent children from harmful Internet con-
tent, was mandated to be installed on all new Chinese comput-
ers in 2009 [25]. The software was found to be far more intru-
sive than officially portrayed, blocking access to a large black-
list of websites in diverse categories, and monitored and dis-
rupted operation of various programs if found to be engaging
in censored activity. TOM-Skype, a joint venture between a
Chinese telephony company TOM Online and Skype Limited,
is a Voice-over-IP (VoIP) chat client program that uses a list of
keywords to censor chat messages in either direction [26].
The censor can coerce users trying to access blocked con-
tent. The censor can set up malicious resources, such as proxy
nodes or fraudulent documents that counteract the publisher’s
goals, to attract unwary users. For example, adversarial guard
relays are known to exist on the Tor network and can be used
to compromise Tor’s client-destination unlinkability property.
See Elahi et al. [27] and several follow-on works [28–30] for
an in-depth analysis. China regularly regulates the online ex-
pression of its citizens, using an army of thousands of workers
to monitor all forms of public communication and to identify
dissidents [31], who may then be targeted for punishment [32].
Publisher Side Censorship. The censor can install censor-
ship software on the publisher or employ a manual censor-
ship process to corrupt the information being published or
disrupt the publication process. A number of studies inves-
tigate Chinese government’s censorship of posts on the na-
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tional microblogging site Sina Weibo. Bamman et al. analyze
three months of Weibo data and find that 16% of politically-
driven content is deleted [33]. Zhu et al. note that Weibo’s
user-generated content is mainly removed during the hour fol-
lowing the post with about 30% of removals occurring within
30 minutes and about 90% within 24 hours [34]. Another
study observes posts from politically active Weibo users over
44 days and finds that censorship varies across topics, with
the highest deletion rate culminating at 82%. They further
note the use of morphs–adapted variants of words to avoid
keyword-based censorship. Weiboscope, a data collection, im-
age aggregation and visualization tool, makes censored Sina
Weibo posts by a set of Chinese microbloggers publicly avail-
able [35].
Within its sphere of influence the censor can use legal or
extralegal coercion to shut down a publisher. History shows
that this can been successful, e.g., a popular anonymous email
service was pressured by the U.S. government to reveal users’
private information [36]. The censor can coerce publishers,
e.g. through threats of imprisonment, into retracting publica-
tions and otherwise chill their speech.
For destinations outside the censor’s sphere of influ-
ence, the censor can mount a network attack, e.g., China
launched an effective distributed denial of service attack
(DDoS) against Github, to target censorship resistance con-
tent hosted there [37]. Other attacks based on infiltration of
resource pools can cause similar denial of service.
Degrade Performance. The censor can manipulate charac-
teristics of the link between the user and publisher, for exam-
ple by introducing delays, low connection time-out values and
other constraints. These techniques are especially useful if the
censor does not have reliable distinguishers, and can be very
effective if the target CRS traffic is brittle and not resilient to
errors, but legitimate traffic is not similarly degraded. Com-
pared to more drastic measures like severing network flows,
degradation is a soft form of censorship that diminishes access
to information while at the same time affording deniability to
the censor.
Anderson uses a set of diagnostics data (such as network
congestion, packet loss, latency) to study the use of throt-
tling of Internet connectivity in Iran between January 2010 and
2013 [38]. He uncovers two extended periods with a 77% and
69% decrease in download throughput respectively; as well as
eight to nine shorter periods. These often coincide with hol-
idays, protest events, international political turmoils and im-
portant anniversaries, and are sometimes corroborated by overt
filtering of online services or jamming of international broad-
cast television.
Block Destinations. Censorship can leverage distinguishers
pertaining to a connection tuple (source IP address, source
port, destination IP address and destination port), or hosts and
domain names to disable information access or publication.
The block can continue for a short period of time to create
a chilling effect and encourage self-censorship on part of the
users. One study notes that the Great Firewall of China (GFW)
blocks communication from a user’s IP address to a destination
IP address and port combination for 90 seconds after observ-
ing ‘objectionable’ activity over that flow [39]. GFW has been
reported to drop packets originating from Tor bridges based on
both source IP address and source port to minimize collateral
damage [40].
Corrupt Routing Information. The censor can disrupt ac-
cess by corrupting information that helps in finding destina-
tions on the Internet. This can be done by changing rout-
ing entries on an intermediate censor-controlled router, or by
manipulating information that supports the routing process,
e.g. BGP hijacking and DNS manipulation. Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) is the de facto protocol for inter-AS rout-
ing. The censor can block a network’s connectivity to the In-
ternet by withdrawing previously advertised network prefixes
or re-advertising them with different properties (rogue BGP
route advertisements). A number of countries have attempted
to effect complete or partial Internet outages in recent years
by withdrawing their networks in the Internet’s global rout-
ing table (Egypt [41], Libya [42], Sudan [43], Myanmar [44]).
DNS is another vital service that maps names given to differ-
ent Internet resources to IP addresses. The hierarchical dis-
tributed nature of DNS makes it vulnerable to censorship.
Typical forms of DNS manipulation involve redirecting DNS
queries for blacklisted domain names to a censor-controlled
IP address (DNS redirection or poisoning), a non-existent IP
address (DNS blackholing) or by simply dropping DNS re-
sponses for blacklisted domains. China’s injection of forged
DNS responses to queries for blocked domain names is well
known, and causes large scale collateral damage by applying
the same censorship policy to outside traffic that traverses Chi-
nese links [45].
Corrupt Flow Content. The censor can compromise infor-
mation or disrupt access by corrupting transport layer payload
of a flow. For example, a censor can inject HTTP 404 Not
Found message in response to requests for censored content
and drop the original response, or modify HTML page in the
body of an HTTP response.
Corrupt Protocol Semantics. The censor can corrupt infor-
mation or disrupt access by manipulating protocol semantics.
A censor can leverage knowledge of protocol specification to
induce disruption on a flow (for example, injecting forged TCP
reset packets into a flow will cause both endpoints to tear down
the connection).
Having gained understanding of various aspects of cen-
sorship, in the next section we turn to censorship resistance
systems (CRSs). Note that there is not much that a CRS can
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offer in terms of block evasion if the censor has installed ma-
licious software on user or publisher machines. We therefore
consider these attacks out-of-scope, and do not discuss these
through the rest of this paper.
3 Censorship Resistance
A censorship resistance system (CRS) thwarts the censor’s at-
tempts to corrupt information, or its access or publication. The
CRS achieves this goal by overcoming the censor’s sphere
of influence and sphere of visibility while maintaining an
acceptable level of security and performance for its clients.
CRS users include whistleblowers, content publishers, citizens
wishing to organize, and many more, and any one CRS may
be employed simultaneously for multiple use cases. Each use
case may require different properties of the CRS. For example,
a whistleblower needs to have their identity protected and be
able to get their message to an outsider without raising suspi-
cions that this is occurring; a content publisher wants that no
amount of coercion, of themselves or the hosts of their con-
tent, could impact the availability of their content; and citizens
wishing to organize would want unblockable access to their
self-organization tool.
3.1 Censorship Resistance Systems:
Components and Functionality
A censorship resistance system is full-blown software that in-
volves interaction between various components to achieve un-
blockable communication between user and publisher (Fig-
ure 4). The user first installs the CRS client software on her ma-
chine which provides the desired CRS functionality. At a high
level, we can break down CRS functionality into two distinct
phases: Communication Establishment and Conversation.
Communication Establishment. Communication Establish-
ment includes various steps that the CRS client performs start-
ing from obtaining CRS credentials from the dissemination
server to be able to access and use the CRS server. The goal
here is that legitimate CRS users should be able to learn
CRS credentials easily, while the censor should not be able
to harvest efficiently. Additionally, the communication ex-
changes between the CRS client, and the dissemination and
CRS servers should be resistant to fingerprinting.
As a preliminary step, the user may employ an out-of-
band link to gather bootstrapping information (such as a secret
key or token). This step is not mandatory and only required by
some systems. The out-of-band link is used to communicate
CRS-operational secrets that are assumed to somehow arrive
with absolute security with respect to the censor. The key is
that there is a limitation inherent to the link that does not allow
it to be used for primary CRS communications, which would
also obviate the need to use a CRS in the first place. An exam-
ple of such a link is a person from outside the censor’s sphere
of visibility bringing addresses of CRS proxies on a USB stick
through the airport and hand delivering it to the user.
Next the CRS client uses the dissemination link to con-
nect to the dissemination server to retrieve information about
the CRS. Some of this information may be public, such as do-
main name mappings to IP addresses, routing information, and
other general Internet communications details. CRS-specific
information is usually also required, including addressing in-
formation of proxy servers or locations of censored content.
In some cases, CRS-specific information is restricted to pre-
vent the censor from learning or tampering with it. CRS cre-
dentials are requested and served over the dissemination link,
which can take many forms, such as ordinary email to a pub-
licly available address, a lookup requested by the CRS client
to a directory serving a file, or an anonymized encrypted con-
nection to a hidden database. Next the CRS client uses the
information previously obtained to connect to the CRS server
over the user-to-CRS link. Some systems may skip the connec-
tion between CRS client and dissemination server, and directly
connect to the CRS server. The connection between the CRS
client and the dissemination server, and that between the CRS
client and the CRS server, can optionally be facilitated by var-
ious intermediate participants. Usually these are proxies that
relay traffic between the CRS client, and the dissemination and
CRS servers.
Conversation. In the Conversation phase, the CRS client has
successfully connected to the CRS server and is ready to ex-
change information. The goal here is to frustrate the censor’s
attempts to block the user-to-CRS link or tamper with the in-
formation being carried, or fingerprint distinguishers to sub-
sequently use for blocking. The CRS client connects to the
CRS server, typically outside the censor’s sphere of influence,
which in turn connects to the publisher. The CRS server acts
like a proxy that sits between the user and publisher, relay-
ing traffic back and forth over an unblockable channel. The
communication between the CRS client and CRS server can
optionally be supported by CRS facilitator(s). The publisher
is the covert page, person, or platform to which the CRS
client ultimately wants access. Examples include a dissident
blog (page), a video call with a friend (person), and tweeting
about the location of the next anti-government rally on Twitter
(platform). Alternatively, the publisher could also be the step-
ping stone to another blocked system. For example, a number
of countries block Tor by blocking access to its entry relays
(bridge nodes). Users in these countries often employ CRS
to establish an unblockable connection with the bridge nodes,
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Fig. 4. The Censorship Resistance System (CRS) provides users unfettered access to information despite censorship. It comprises of CRS client
software installed on the user which obtains information (CRS credentials) about how to access the CRS server from dissemination server over the
dissemination link. The CRS client then uses these credentials to connect to the CRS server over the user-to-CRS link. Optionally there could be one
or more CRS facilitators on the dissemination link and the user-to-CRS link which support the CRS’s operation. The CRS server connects to the pub-
lisher over the CRS-to-publisher link, effectively acting as a proxy that enables unblockable communication between the user and publisher. It is com-
mon for CRSs to handle the CRS-to-publisher link separately than the other two links due to different security and performance properties
and subsequently bootstrap into the Tor network. In this ex-
ample, the bridge node is the publisher from the perspective of
the CRS client.
It is common for CRSs to treat the dissemination link and
the user-to-CRS link separately than the CRS-to-publisher link
as these lend themselves to different design, implementation,
and software distribution practices. Most CRSs provide cir-
cumvention on the user-to-CRS link due to its flashpoint sta-
tus in the censorship arms race: censorship on this link is less
intrusive and more convenient for the censor as most of the
communication infrastructure is within its sphere of influence,
and fingerprinting is more effective as bulk exchange of in-
formation takes place on this link. In contrast, being typically
outside the censor’s sphere of influence, the CRS-to-publisher
link may simply provide access to the publisher, without offer-
ing any additional security properties and could be simply im-
plemented as a HTTP or SOCKS proxy, or as a VPN. Alterna-
tively, the CRS-to-publisher link may connect to an anonymity
system like Tor [46] to offer privacy properties in addition to
unblockable access to information.
Example. To tie things together, we provide the example of a
CRS, ScrambleSuit [47], illustrating the phases of Communi-
cation Establishment and Conversation, and the interaction be-
tween various components. In the Communication Establish-
ment phase in ScrambleSuit, the CRS client retrieves a short-
lived ticket from the CRS over a low-bandwidth out-of-band
channel. The CRS client redeems the ticket from the dissem-
ination server for mutual authentication. After successful au-
thentication, the dissemination server gives the client a ticket
for the next connection, so that the CRS client does not have
to use the out-of-band channel to retrieve tickets for subse-
quent connections. The CRS client includes this ticket in its
connection request to the CRS server. The CRS server only re-
sponds to a connection request if it contains a valid ticket, thus
obfuscating its existence from the censor that probes (and sub-
sequently fingerprints) IP addresses that run the CRS server. In
the Conversation phase, the CRS client and CRS server trans-
form their traffic into random-looking bytes to thwart content-
based fingerprinting, and remove flow fingerprints by random-
izing packet lengths and flow timing.
4 Systematization Methodology
We now describe our methodology to evaluate censorship re-
sistance systems. We conducted a comprehensive survey of
CRSs–totalling 73 systems–both deployed and proposed in
academic publications until February 2016. We selected aca-
demic publications that appeared in well-respected venues in
security research, and for deployed tools we turned to refer-
ences of the surveyed academic papers, and results of search
on Google Scholar using relevant keywords. We include the
full list of CRSs surveyed in Appendix A.
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Our evaluation of CRSs spans four dimensions: security,
privacy, performance and deployability. We break down each
of these dimensions into specific properties. As a large num-
ber of CRSs have emerged over the years, we base our evalua-
tion on schemes representing recurring themes and underlying
concepts in the censorship resistance landscape, instead of in-
dividual systems. We believe that evaluating CRSs by common
schemes rather than individual systems is a useful abstraction
to visualize their strengths, limitations and opportunities. Next
we select a representative CRS from the group of all systems
that employ the given strategy, and evaluate it along the four
dimensions of security, privacy, performance and deployabil-
ity. We note that our selection of the representative CRS is
based on how well it captures the given strategy; a CRS may
well employ multiple strategies in a layered design. It is pos-
sible that some properties of the representative CRS do not
exclusively represent a given scheme; we indicate in our dis-
cussion where this is the case.
We apply the evaluation methodology sketched above to
each of the two phases of CRS functionality, Communication
Establishment and Conversation. While most properties along
the dimensions of security, privacy, performance and deploya-
bility are common across both Communication Establishment
and Conversation, we state where this is not the case. Our
methodology may be described as a semi-structured approach
to evaluation of censorship resistance systems. Most proper-
ties have binary values (has, does not have), while some also
have an intermediate value (partially has).
The evaluation process involved all six authors, each act-
ing as a domain expert, and included the following steps. (i)
Survey and categorization: First, two groups of two authors
studied all the 73 CRSs identified. This exercise generated two
lists of common schemes for censorship resistance across all
the CRSs surveyed, and a representative system for each of
these schemes. The two lists were consolidated into one and
then refined through discussion amongst the four contribut-
ing authors. (ii) Developing evaluation framework: Two au-
thors developed the framework to evaluate CRSs, which was
iteratively refined through discussion with the other two au-
thors. (iii) Evaluation: Once the evaluation framework, CRS
strategies and representative CRSs had been identified, one au-
thor evaluated all the representative systems, and then divided
all the evaluated CRSs into three sets (where each set con-
tained systems corresponding to a diverse mix of CRS strate-
gies) and invited the other three authors to independently ver-
ify the evaluation of these systems. Differences in evaluation
were resolved through iterative discussions and incorporated
in the evaluation. (iv) Finally, to ensure inter-rater reliability
the other two, thus far uninvolved, authors verified the sound-
ness of the evaluation process and scores assigned.
Another important dimension of CRS evaluation along-
side security, privacy, performance and deployability, is usabil-
ity. In this paper, however, we restrict our scope to the first four
of these and defer usability to future work. Usability evalua-
tion of CRSs is not well understood, and forms an emerging
research area.
4.1 Security Properties
Censorship resistance systems incorporate a number of secu-
rity properties; to prevent or slow the censor from learning
high-quality distinguishers; to make it hard for the censor to
distinguish CRS traffic from other, allowed network flows; and
to ensure CRS availability even in the case of successful detec-
tion e.g. by taking advantage of the censor’s resource limita-
tions by raising the overall cost of processing network traffic.
Unobservability. The censor cannot detect prohibited com-
munication or the use of CRS itself based on content or flow-
based signatures, or destinations associated with the CRS or
those known to serve prohibited content. The following are
three common techniques.
– Content Obfuscation: Communication exchanges be-
tween the CRS client and other CRS components do not
contain unique static strings or string patterns that the cen-
sor can associate with prohibited material or the CRS it-
self.
– Flow Obfuscation: Communication exchanges between
the CRS client and other CRS components do not contain
unique stochastic patterns (such as packet sizes and tim-
ing) that the censor can associate with prohibited material
or the CRS itself.
– Destination Obfuscation: The identity and network lo-
cation (e.g. IP addresses, domain names and hosts) of the
dissemination server, CRS server, and key facilitators is
hidden.
Unblockability. The censor, even after having identified pro-
hibited content or usage of the CRS, is either unable or unwill-
ing to block communications, often due to collateral damage.
Two common techniques follow:
– Outside Censor’s Influence: This involves placing criti-
cal CRS components susceptible to attack beyond the cen-
sor’s sphere of influence (and sometimes sphere of visibil-
ity). In this case, even if the censor can identify the CRS
component as a target, the censor may still be unable to
launch an effective attack.
– Increase Censor’s Cost to Block: The censor’s block-
ing decision depends on a number of factors, such as the
accuracy of distinguishers, and blocking mechanism em-
ployed. In particular, the censor’s policy must make con-
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sideration for the acceptable false positive rate as these
have political and economic ramifications [48]. Mecha-
nisms under this category obfuscate CRS credentials or
infrastructure in such a way that blocking it incurs unac-
ceptable collateral damage.
Availability. Does the CRS incorporate mitigation against De-
nial of Service attacks on its components, either directly or by
leveraging a DoS-resistant participant? In general, there is a
lack of robust techniques to completely neutralize DoS attacks,
with general mitigation strategies involving over-provisioning
of bandwidth and IP addresses.
Communication Integrity. Access to information and the in-
formation itself is robust in the presence of a censor that tam-
pers with information, or actively manipulates channel prop-
erties, such as injecting, modifying or dropping packets, or
changing routing assumptions.
– Message Integrity: Does the CRS verify integrity of data
in the presence of an active censor that can tamper with it
while in transit or stored on the publisher?
Server/Publisher Authentication. Does the CRS in-
corporate authentication of the dissemination and CRS
servers (Communication Establishment phase), and the
publisher (Conversation phase).
– Packet Loss Support: Is the CRS resilient against packet
drops induced by the censor? (While packet drops can im-
pact Communication Establishment as well as Conversa-
tion, we consider it only in the latter case where the threat
is more pressing due to the volume of information ex-
changed).
– Out-of-Order Packets Support: Can the CRS handle
packets that arrive out-of-order due to the censor injecting
random delays to traffic? (Applies to Conversation phase
only).
4.2 Privacy Properties
This includes anonymity and deniability for CRS components
to mitigate coercion by the censor. In a CRS that provides coer-
cion resistance to its components, the censor’s threats of force
are of limited impact, such as when the CRS component is out-
side the censor’s sphere of influence, or the system is designed
in a way that makes it technically impossible to comply with
the censor’s demands.
User Anonymity. Can the CRS client anonymously retrieve
information from the dissemination server (Communication
Establishment) and the publisher (Conversation)? Here the
threat is from a censor that can enumerate (and subsequently
coerce) users by observing connections to the dissemination
server and the publisher.
Server/Publisher Anonymity. Can the dissemination server
(Communication Establishment) and publisher (Conversation)
disseminate information to users without revealing their iden-
tity? Here the threat is from a censor that identifies (and sub-
sequently coerces) servers and publishers of information by
observing where CRS clients connect to (for example, by mas-
querading as a CRS client), or where prohibited information is
fetched from (for example, through passive analysis of data on
the wire).
User Deniability. This means that the censor cannot reason-
ably confirm if the user intentionally accessed prohibited in-
formation or used the CRS, and therefore cannot implicate
users for lack of sufficient evidence. User deniability can be
enforced by transforming traffic to an obfuscated form when
it leaves user machine, for example through encryption or
steganography.
Server/Publisher Deniability. This means that the censor
cannot reasonably confirm if the dissemination server or pub-
lisher intentionally served prohibited information or partici-
pated in the CRS, and therefore lacks sufficient evidence to im-
plicate the two. This can be enforced by obfuscating responses
of the dissemination server and publisher, for example through
encryption or steganography.
Participant Deniability. Parties that support the CRS in its
operations should be able to deny intentional participation in
the CRS, or helping disseminate prohibited information, thus
preventing the censor from blocking them or meting out pun-
ishment.
4.3 Performance Properties
All censorship resistance systems have certain performance
characteristics: in some cases these are the side effect of the
CRS scheme employed with little room for improvement,
while in other cases these are due to inadequate design choices
of the representative system and can be ameliorated.
Latency. For Communication Establishment, it means how
long does it take from when the CRS client initiates Commu-
nication Establishment to when it is ready to start Conversa-
tion, compared to the baseline approach of directly connecting
to the CRS server. In the context of Conversation, latency is
the delay introduced by the CRS, compared to the baseline ap-
proach of downloading a document over a standard protocol
like HTTP without employing the CRS. A number of factors
can contribute to CRS communications latency including arti-
ficial inter-arrival times between packets, packet padding and
the additional CRS protocol header.
Goodput. This refers to the useful bandwidth available for
the information originally requested by the CRS client, and
amounts to the total bandwidth minus the CRS’s operational
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overhead. A high-goodput CRS implies that the CRS is high-
throughput and has low operational overhead resulting in high
amounts of bandwidth available for the CRS client to re-
trieve information. A low-goodput CRS means that either the
CRS is low-throughput to begin with or that the CRS is high-
throughput but has high overhead resulting in little bandwidth
for information requested by the CRS client. (Applies to Con-
versation phase only).
Stability. Do the performance characteristics of the CRS, such
as communication latency and goodput, remain consistent?
For each scheme, we identify factors (e.g. reliance on exter-
nal conditions beyond CRS control), and the degree to which
these can cause performance to fluctuate, and rate accordingly.
Scalability. How well does the CRS scale as the number of
CRS clients that want to communicate with the dissemination
server, or access information using the CRS server, increases?
For each scheme, we identify challenges and the degree to
which these can affect scalability, and rate accordingly.
Computational Overhead. This refers to the degree of addi-
tional computational resources incurred by the dissemination
server (compared to the baseline approach of directly connect-
ing to the CRS server) and the CRS server (compared to the
baseline approach of directly downloading a web page without
employing the CRS) due to CRS usage. In Communication Es-
tablishment, this is typically proportional to the cryptographic
overhead introduced by the authentication scheme in use by
the dissemination server.
Storage Overhead. This refers to the degree of additional
storage required by the dissemination server and the CRS
server due to CRS usage compared to the baselines described
for computational overhead.
4.4 Deployability Properties
The utility of a CRS depends not only on its security, privacy
and performance properties, but also on how amenable it is
to be deployed and used in the real world. This depends on a
number of factors ranging from cost to implement and main-
tain the CRS, to the degree of cooperation expected from par-
ticipants.
Synchronicity. Does the system require all components rel-
evant to the Communication Establishment and Conversation
phase to be online at the same time?
Network Agnostic. Do the Communication Establishment
and Conversation phases make specific network layer assump-
tions (for example, specific routing requirements, or assump-
tions about packet fragmentation and TTL values) to function
correctly and as intended?
Coverage. This refers to the degree of Internet access (such
as fraction of the Web, and Internet services and protocols) en-
abled by the CRS. We rate a CRS to have high coverage if it
can be used to access any content, medium coverage if there
are restrictions on content type or length, and low coverage if
both content type and length are restricted. (Applies to Con-
versation phase only).
Participation. A large number of CRSs depend on cooper-
ation from participants. We use various metrics to assess the
quality and flexibility of cooperation the CRS requires from
participants.
– Quantitative Incentivization: Is the incentive structure
to encourage participants to help the Conversation based
on tangible rewards, monetary or in kind (in contrast to
qualitative incentives, such as goodwill and public rela-
tions)?
– Distributed Participation: This represents the degree to
which participation is diffused among cooperative enti-
ties: a low value corresponds to a single organized en-
tity, such as a corporation, a company, or an institu-
tion; medium value represents multiple organized bodies;
while a high value indicates individual volunteers partici-
pating in personal capacity. This property has implications
for CRS stability and scalability if participants opt out of
the CRS due to policy changes.
– Voluntary Participation: Is the participant aware that the
CRS has employed it for censorship resistance, or are they
unwitting?
– Conditional Participation: Is the participation premised
on specific conditions, such as popularity, reputation and
location (in contrast to open participation)?
– Deterministic Cost: Does the CRS provide estimated
cost to participants, or alternatively allow them to control
the degree of participation in the CRS?
– Security Delegation: Are the security properties offered
by the CRS compromised due to subverted participant(s)?
– Privacy Delegation: Are the privacy properties offered
by the CRS compromised due to subverted participant(s)?
5 Communication Establishment
We describe schemes employed by CRSs to enable the CRS
client to obtain CRS credentials, while preventing the censor
from detecting and blocking Communication Establishment,
or harvesting and fingerprinting CRS credentials.
5.1 High Churn Access
This scheme relies on the selection of CRS credentials that
change regularly so that these cannot be preemptively blocked
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by the censor. Since the censor has yet to discover distin-
guisher values, there is a window of opportunity where mis-
classification can occur.
5.2 Rate-Limited Access
To prevent the censor from harvesting CRS credentials as a
legitimate CRS participant, the CRS may limit the rate at
which CRS credentials can be queried. This is usually done
by requiring proofs of work from participants, partitioning the
value space over time slices and based on CRS participant at-
tribute(s), or including reputation-based mechanisms.
Proof of Work. To prevent the censor from harvesting CRS
information at scale, some CRSs employ proof of work ap-
proaches, such as captchas and other puzzles. The assumption
is that these are too expensive for wide-scale harvesting by a
resource-bounded censor.
Time Partitioning. This involves partitioning CRS creden-
tials over time slices, e.g. by choosing a large pool of unpre-
dictable values and then using and retiring them within a short
time frame. As a result, the censor needs to continuously allo-
cate resources to keep up-to-date with CRS values.
Keyspace Partitioning. This refers to partitioning CRS infor-
mation over attribute(s) specific to users, e.g. client IP address.
This way, a user only learns a restricted set of CRS credentials
over the value space.
5.3 Active Probing Resistance Schemes
A censor may probe suspected dissemination and CRS servers
to confirm if they participate in the CRS. To mitigate this
threat, the CRS introduces a sequence of steps during the Com-
munication Establishment phase; these steps are feasible for a
single CRS user to follow, but hard for a censor to perform at
scale. The servers can obfuscate their association with the CRS
from an unauthenticated user by pretending to be offline alto-
gether (obfuscating aliveness), or by providing an innocuous
response or no response at all CRS (obfuscating service).
Obfuscating Aliveness. A dissemination server may not re-
spond to connection requests from a CRS client until they
complete an expected sequence of steps, e.g. by requiring
clients to embed a secret token in the request, or encoding a
valid request through a series of packets to a number of ports
in a specific order.
Obfuscating Service. This differs from the previous case in
that the dissemination server responds to connection requests
from a CRS client (thus revealing its aliveness), but refuses
to speak the CRS protocol until the CRS client completes an
expected sequence of steps.
5.4 Trust-based Access
To only service requests from legitimate CRS clients, the
server may associate an element of trust with CRS users based
on previous behaviour, and the server only responds to re-
quests from CRS clients with satisfactory reputation. In some
systems, the reputation of CRS users is derived from their so-
cial network graph.
5.5 Discussion
In Table 1, we present our evaluation of censorship resistance
schemes related to the Communication Establishment phase
of CRS functionality. The rows correspond to the security,
privacy, performance and deployability properties described
in Section 4. The columns represent our evaluation of CRS
schemes (using a representative CRS) along these properties;
we state in our discussion where properties of the represen-
tative CRS do not exclusively represent a given scheme. The
last row of the table provides a breakdown of the deployment
status of all the CRSs for a scheme (a complete list of citations
for these systems can be found in Table 3 in Appendix A).
Most of the efforts in the area of censorship resistance have
concentrated on Conversation: we found only 11 systems for
Communication Establishment (compared to 62 for Conver-
sation), of which about half have tools available. Tschantz et
al. note that the research focus on Conversation is orthogonal
to real censorship attacks that concentrate on Communication
Establishment [6]. We now present the results from our evalua-
tion, highlighting common trends and discussing the strengths
and limitations of the CRS schemes. We emphasize that the
effectiveness of a given CRS depends on the context in which
it has been employed; the goal of our evaluation is to charac-
terize the suitability of CRS schemes to different use cases and
censor capabilities.
We observe that schemes where the server responds af-
ter validating users (active probing resistance, proof of work)
typically offer content obfuscation, e.g. by ensuring that mes-
sages containing puzzles, tokens or similar credentials do not
have content-based signatures. A naive active probing resis-
tance system that includes a fixed-length token in the request,
is vulnerable to flow fingerprinting, as the censor can detect
connections that always begin by sending a fixed number of
bytes. Such length-based signatures can be removed by using
pseudo-random padding [47]. With respect to performance,
the user validation step in these schemes comes at the cost of
increased time to join the system, higher computational needs,
possibly coupled with additional storage requirements if the
server stores identifiers for static matching instead of verifying
identifiers at run-time. As disparate interactions are required
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Table 1. Evaluation of censorship resistance schemes related to Communication Establishment phase of CRS functionality. Notation for binary values: 3 has property, 7 does not have property. Notation for
non-binary values: has property, partially has property, does not have property. – means the property does not apply to the given scheme. The last row provides a breakdown of deployment status of
all the systems surveyed for the given scheme; a full list of the corresponding citations is provided in Appendix A.
High Churn Access
Rate Limited Active Probing
Trust-Based Access
Proof of Life/Work Time Partitioning Keyspace Partitioning Obfuscating Aliveness Obfuscating Service
System Flashproxy [49] Defiance [50] Tor Bridges [51] Keyspace-Hopping [52] SilentKnock [53] ScrambleSuit [47] Proximax [54]
S
ec
ur
ity
Unobservability
Content Obfuscation 7 3 3 3 3 3 7
Flow Obfuscation 7 7 7 7 7 3 7
Destination Obfuscation 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Unblockability
Outside Censor Influence 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
Increase Censor Cost to Block 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Availability 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Communication Integrity
Server Authentication 7 3 3 7 7 7 7
Message Integrity 7 3 3 7 3 3 7
P
ri
va
cy
User Anonymity 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Publisher/Server Anonymity 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
User Deniability 7 3 3 3 3 3 7
Publisher/Server Deniability 7 3 3 3 3 3 7
Participant Deniability 7 3 3 3 – – 7
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
Low Latency
Stability
Scalability
Low Computation
Low Storage Overhead
D
ep
lo
ya
bi
lit
y
Synchronicity
Network Agnosticism 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Participation
Quantitative Incentivization 7 7 7 7 – – 7
Distributed Participation – –
Voluntary Participation 3 3 3 3 – – 3
Conditional Participation 7 7 3 7 – – 3
Deterministic Cost 3 7 3 7 – – –
Security Delegation 3 3 3 3 – – 3
Privacy Delegation 3 3 3 3 – – 3
S
ta
tu
s Academic & Tool available 2 0 0 0 2 1 0
Academic paper only 0 2 0 1 0 0 1
Tool only 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
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between the CRS client and different CRS servers and partici-
pants, these can be at least partially conducted asynchronously,
usually within some time window. Schemes that obfuscate ser-
vice need more consideration with respect to load balancing;
for each request a TCP connection is still established, since
validation takes place at the application layer.
Most trust-based and high churn access schemes do not
obfuscate content and such functionality must be built on top
of the scheme. The same is true of flow obfuscation: communi-
cation establishment involves just few brief interactions while
statistical classifiers, especially those based on inter-packet ar-
rival times, work best on high volume data. Schemes that in-
volve straight forward access to CRS servers with some pru-
dence on part of the server to hand out values with discretion
(e.g. high churn access, time partitioning, keyspace hopping,
proxy and trust-based schemes) tend to have low latency. Typ-
ically there is a single interaction between the CRS client and
the CRS server directly or through intermediate forwarding
participants, consequently the client, server and all participants
need to be online at the same time.
A particular consideration for high churn access systems
is that new values must constantly be available. However, if
these values are opportunistically derived from volunteer par-
ticipants, the system is neither stable nor scalable; it is not
clear how long a value will remain available, and how many
values will be available as the number of users increases. A
possible mitigation is to have a notion of participant quality
(for example, in terms of available bandwidth and uptime) so
that requests are more intelligently distributed under increased
demand (conditional participation). We note that conditional
participation enables the CRS to adequately plan issues con-
cerning system scalability and stability. In a broader context,
we note that most participant-based schemes recruit individual
entities who volunteer to help based on qualitative incentiviza-
tion, usually goodwill. All these schemes fail to offer privacy
and security if one or more participants are controlled by the
censor. Any participant can potentially compromise security
and privacy properties of the CRS: in such an event, decentral-
ized systems fare better in terms of damage control.
A shortcoming of rate-limited access and active probing
resistance schemes is that the censor can sometimes deploy
more resources than anticipated (the Sybil attack). The censor
can deploy or control a large enough pool of resources to har-
vest the CRS value space to effectively neutralize the benefits
of these schemes (e.g. to neutralize proof of work schemes,
the censor can invest in computational power to solve multiple
puzzles in parallel [55]). Perhaps this explains why proof of
work schemes only exist in literature.
In high churn access the CRS value space harvested by
the censor is quickly outdated; effectively, distinguishers har-
vested by the censor are unstable and inconsistent, thus neces-
sitating frequent updates. A challenge for high churn access
schemes is how to manage the value space so that new val-
ues are constantly available, especially when the value space is
contingent on volunteers whom the CRS cannot directly con-
trol. Trust-based schemes are vulnerable to malicious partici-
pants. To gain access to a CRS employing trust-based access,
the censor must impersonate as a credible user, for example by
stealing credentials of an existing user, or earning good repu-
tation over a period of time, both of which do not scale well.
Moreover, most schemes track CRS user reputation even af-
ter initial authorization, and malicious behaviour can lead to
ejection. However, few subverted CRS users can potentially
deplete and block the entire value space. This can be mitigated
by rate-limiting the information available per CRS user.
Most schemes do not incorporate authentication of dis-
semination and CRS servers. This is a problem as the censor
can masquerade as a server and enumerate and coerce users.
To mitigate this threat, the CRS can maintain a centralized au-
thority which the CRS client can query independently to estab-
lish authenticity of a server (e.g. Tor directory services [56]).
Alternatively, the censor can masquerade as a server and dis-
rupt CRS accessibility by distributing bogus CRS credentials.
This threat is particularly relevant when the CRS design in-
cludes volunteer servers which cannot be authenticated. Pos-
sible mitigation includes for the CRS to digitally sign the in-
formation distributed by servers, so that the CRS users can
verify integrity of information obtained from untrusted servers
(e.g. Defiance NET payloads). For the same reason, most ac-
tive probing schemes offer message integrity so that the censor
cannot tamper with the information that validates the CRS user
to the server. On the other hand, we note that most schemes
(high churn access, keyspace hopping, trust-based access) that
manage control to unauthenticated proxies do not offer mes-
sage integrity, and this has to be handled by another applica-
tion on top of it.
With respect to privacy, none of the schemes offer user
anonymity; if the censor successfully fingerprints credentials
of CRS servers, it can identify users that connect to these.
However, it may prove difficult to implicate users at this point
because the user has only attempted to use the CRS, but not
actually used it to access blocked content. The same applies
to server anonymity; the censor can masquerade as a legiti-
mate CRS user and identify the servers that the CRS client
contacts. Most schemes offer user and server deniability by
using encryption and/or steganography, which somewhat al-
leviates the lack of anonymity. Trust-based schemes are an
exception; these erect stringent criteria for CRS participation
but do not adequately address user deniability if one or more
members have been subverted. Schemes that rely on volun-
teer participants have an obvious incentive to offer participant
deniability. Some schemes waive this property and instead as-
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sume that, being outside the censor’s sphere of influence, the
participant will be immune to coercion attempts.
6 Conversation
In this section, we describe schemes employed by CRSs
to evade detection and blocking in the Conversation phase.
We note that the identified schemes enable unobservable
and unblockable access to information (access-centric) and/or
may incorporate additional measures to store information for
increased availability and coercion resistance (publication-
centric). We observe this distinction in our discussion for clar-
ity, however, we note that it is possible for a CRS to employ
schemes from both groups.
6.1 Access-Centric Schemes
Schemes in this category protect access to information over
the user-to-CRS link (Figure 4) by safeguarding security and
privacy of relevant CRS components, and by protecting infor-
mation in transit from corruption.
Mimicry. This scheme transforms traffic to look like
whitelisted communication, such that the transformed traf-
fic resembles the syntax or content of an allowed protocol.
Mimicry can be of known protocol, or randomness, and can
be at the level of content as well as flow.
Content Mimicry evades censorship by imitating the syn-
tax of an innocuous protocol (e.g. HTTP) or content (e.g.
HTML). Typically the mimicry is based on widely-deployed
protocols or popular content thus complicating a censor’s task
by (i) increasing the censor’s work load as there is more vol-
ume of traffic to inspect, and (ii) increasing the collateral dam-
age associated with wholesale protocol blocking. Another ap-
proach is to make traffic content look like an unknown pro-
tocol, either by imitating randomness or arbitrarily deviating
from a known blocked one. This idea is motivated by the
general assumption that the censor implements blacklisting of
known protocols and is unwilling to incur high collateral dam-
age associated with whitelisting.
Flow Mimicry is similar to content mimicry except that
the CRS imitates flow-level characteristics (e.g. packet length
and inter-arrival timings) of an unblocked protocol, or ran-
domizes flow-level characteristics to remove statistical finger-
prints.
Tunnelling. In contrast to mimicry where the CRS pretends
to be an unblocked protocol and may manage to only par-
tially mimic the target protocol, in this scheme CRS traffic is
tunnelled through an unblocked application thus avoiding the
problems inherent to mimicry.
Covert Channel. involves hiding CRS communication in
a cover medium, creating a covert channel within the cover
which transmits CRS traffic in a manner not part of its original
design (e.g. hiding HTTP requests within a cover image). As a
result, CRS traffic is not only hard to detect, but also deniable
for both users and publishers. Steganographic techniques are
useful here.
Traffic Manipulation. This scheme exploits the limitations
of the Censor’s traffic analysis model and shapes CRS traffic
such that the censor is unable to fingerprint it. Effectively, this
scheme renders even cleartext traffic unobservable which is
particularly useful for countries that prohibit encrypted traffic.
Destination Obfuscation. To prevent the censor from observ-
ing and blocking the key destinations the CRS client directly
connects to, the client can instead relay CRS traffic through
one or more intermediate nodes to obfuscate CRS destinations.
The CRS may employ a proxy as CRS facilitator to relay
traffic between the CRS client and the CRS server. Usually, the
proxies change frequently to avoid getting blocked. The CRS
traffic can possibly be relayed through a number of proxies for
improved privacy.
In decoy routing, clients covertly signal a cooperating in-
termediate router to deflect their traffic purportedly en route
to an unblocked destination (to evade the censor) to a blocked
one. The deflecting routers must be located on the forward net-
work path from the client to the unblocked destination.
6.2 Publication-Centric Schemes
Schemes in this category protect information over the CRS-
to-publisher link (Figure 4). These systems allow publishers
to push information to the CRS which is stored among multi-
ple CRS servers, and served to CRS users upon request. Con-
sequently, the main goal of publication-centric schemes is to
ensure availability and integrity of information, while offer-
ing deniability to CRS servers, and preferably to CRS users
and publishers too. It is common for these schemes to refer to
published information as documents, hence we interchange-
ably refer to information as documents.
Content Redundancy. refers to storing content redundantly
on a large number of CRS servers, typically placed in different
jurisdictions making it hard for the censor to remove prohib-
ited content from all the servers.
Distributed Content Storage. breaks the content into smaller
chunks and distributes these among a number of CRS servers
so that no server has the full document. To reconstruct the doc-
ument, the corresponding chunks are retrieved from the CRS
servers where these are stored.
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Table 2. Evaluation of censorship resistance schemes related to Conversation phase of CRS functionality. Notation for binary values: 3 has property, 7 does not have property. Notation for non-binary val-
ues: has property, partially has property, does not have property. – means the property does not apply to the given scheme. The last row provides a breakdown of deployment status of all the sys-
tems surveyed for the given scheme; a full list of the corresponding citations is provided in Appendix A.
Access-Centric Schemes Publication-Centric Schemes
Content/Flow Obfuscation Destination Obfuscation
Content Redundancy Distributed Storage
Mimicry Tunnelling Covert Channel Traffic Manip. Proxy Decoy Routing
System SkypeMorph [57] Freewave [58] Collage [59] Khattak et al. [60] Tor [46] Cirripede [61] Freenet [62] Tangler [63]
S
ec
ur
ity
Unobservability
Content Obfuscation 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Flow Obfuscation 3 7 – 7 7 3 7 7
Destination Obfuscation 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
Unblockability
Outside Censor Influence 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 3
Increase Censor Cost to Block 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Availability 7 7 3 7 7 7 3 3
Communication Integrity
Publisher Authentication 3 7 3 7 7 7 3 3
Message Integrity 3 7 7 7 3 3 3 3
Packet Drop Resistance 7 7 – 7 7 3 – –
Out-of-Order Resistance 3 3 – 7 3 3 – –
P
ri
va
cy
User Anonymity 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
Publisher Anonymity 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
User Deniability 3 3 3 7 3 3 7 3
Publisher Deniability 3 7 3 7 7 7 7 3
Participant Deniability 3 3 3 – 3 3 7 3
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
Low Latency
High Goodput – –
Stability
Scalability
Low Computation
Low Storage Overhead
D
ep
lo
ya
bi
lit
y
Synchronicity 3 3 7 3 3 3 7 7
Network Agnosticism 3 3 – 7 3 7 3 3
Coverage
Participation
Quantitative Incentivization 7 7 7 – 7 7 7 3
Distributed Participation –
Voluntary Participation 7 7 7 – 3 3 3 3
Conditional Participation 3 3 3 – 3 7 3 3
Deterministic Cost 7 7 7 – 3 7 7 3
Security Delegation 3 3 3 – 3 3 3 3
Privacy Delegation 3 3 3 – 3 3 3 3
S
ta
tu
s Academic & Tool available 2 0 1 2 4 0 1 0
Academic paper only 8 7 7 2 4 5 4 1
Tool only 5 2 0 1 10 0 0 0
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6.3 Discussion
In Table 2, we present our evaluation of censorship resistance
schemes related to the Conversation phase of CRS function-
ality. The rows correspond to the security, privacy, perfor-
mance and deployability properties described in Section 4;
and the columns represent evaluation of CRS schemes iden-
tified above, along these properties. As our evaluation is based
on representative systems for various CRS schemes, we state
in our discussion where properties of the representative CRS
do not exclusively represent a given scheme. The last row
of the table shows a breakdown of the deployment status of
all the CRSs for a given type of scheme (a complete list of
citations for these systems can be found in Table 4 in Ap-
pendix A). We surveyed 62 systems, of which 28 have end user
tools available—most of which are mimicry and proxy-based
schemes. We now discuss common trends, as well as strengths
and limitations of the CRS schemes based on our evaluation.
Our goal is to characterize the suitability of the CRS schemes
to different use cases and censor capabilities.
We observe that nearly all access-centric schemes offer
content obfuscation, but only mimicry schemes obfuscate traf-
fic flows. Some mimicry schemes morph traffic to resemble the
content or flow-level characteristics of a cover protocol. This
approach is inherently imperfect as cover protocols are gen-
erally complex, with disparities stemming from incomplete or
incorrect cover protocol imitation, such as failure to handle
errors in a consistent manner. The censor can leverage such
disparities to identify evasive traffic through active manipula-
tion [64–66]. Other schemes morph traffic such that its content
and flow-based features look random. Effectively the censor,
being unable to classify such traffic as any known protocol,
cannot block. However, if the censor only allows whitelisted
protocols then it can flag random looking traffic as anomalous
and block it. Though most mimicry-based systems offer user
deniability, they typically lack in destination obfuscation and
most privacy properties.
Tunnelling ameliorates the limitations of mimicking cover
protocols to some degree (such as destination obfuscation,
and resistance to dropped packets), however, the censor may
be able to take advantage of inconsistencies in channel us-
age or content. The CRS traffic may still have flow-based fea-
tures which distinguish it from the cover protocol [64]. Fur-
ther, the CRS may rely on channel characteristics in a dif-
ferent manner from the cover protocol; if the cover protocol
is more robust to network degradation, for example, the cen-
sor can manipulate the network to disrupt CRS traffic while
not affecting legitimate cover protocol traffic [67]. Tunnelling
systems typically leverage popular third-party platforms to in-
crease collateral damage associated with blocking the CRS.
As such platforms are provisioned for Internet-scale perfor-
mance, tunnelling-based systems also inherit high availabil-
ity and scalability. Both mimicry and tunnelling schemes in-
cur additional protocol overhead, resulting in decreased good-
put, and additional latency in extracting CRS traffic from the
cover (e.g. demodulating voice data received over a cover
VoIP application to recover tunnelled information). Despite its
strengths, tunnelling schemes have largely received attention
in academic literature, with only two tools available.
In our survey, proxy-based schemes have the highest num-
ber of end user tools available. Both proxy-based schemes and
decoy routing relay traffic through intermediate participants.
In the former case, traffic can be redirected through multiple
proxies, which can lead to increase in latency. A crucial com-
ponent of the decoy routing strategy is that by building cir-
cumvention into the Internet infrastructure, the need for com-
munication establishment is obviated: the CRS client includes
the credentials needed to join the CRS using covert channel
inside a request for an unblocked overt destination, which is
intercepted by a decoy router on path to the overt destina-
tion and deflected to a proxy that facilitates communication
with a blocked destination. In addition to destination obfus-
cation, the use of TLS leverages content obfuscation, good
performance and resistance to active manipulation (we find
in our evaluation that most decoy routing systems are resilient
against attacks involving dropped packets). However, the re-
quirement for decoy routers to be deployed in cooperative ISPs
is based on the assumption that it is impossible for the censor
to “route around” cooperating ISPs without significant collat-
eral damage: if this assumption is invalid, however, the cen-
sor can avoid or otherwise blackhole the route and nullify this
scheme [68]. We note that none of these systems have been
deployed; the requirement to be supported by real-world ISPs
poses a significant deployment challenge, and scalability is de-
pendent on the number and location of supporting ISPs as de-
coy routers should be deployed widely enough to be on path
to a large number of overt destinations.
Traffic manipulation schemes use low level network tricks
to cause the censor to misinterpret traffic flows and effectively
fail to detect blocked content. As traffic manipulation schemes
make certain assumptions about censorship apparatus, it is vul-
nerable to attacks involving out-of-order packets. It is hard
to offer a good degree of performance if the censor’s policy
changes frequently. For the same reason, this scheme is not
scalable: the CRS has to be tuned and updated according to
individual censorship policies.
Covert channel-based systems have been popular in aca-
demic literature, but there is only one such tool available. This
scheme provides unobservable communication, while main-
taining a high degree of privacy for all CRS components. Like
tunnelling-based systems, the robustness of the scheme de-
pends on how closely the CRS traffic blends into content of
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the cover medium, and conforms to semantics of the cover
protocol. Some cover media are vulnerable to specific attacks:
timing-based covert channels are sensitive to dropped and out
of order packets; while covert channels built into header values
of network protocols (e.g. timestamp, initial sequence num-
bers, padding values and different flags) can attract attention
for being anomalous due to abnormal usage, or the covert
channel can be destroyed if the censor normalizes fields that
applications typically do not use. Attaining good performance
is a challenge for covert channel-based schemes; as CRS traf-
fic has to be encoded inside cover traffic, the amount of in-
formation that the cover traffic can carry (goodput) is limited.
Therefore, the coverage of these schemes is typically restricted
to static short messages. Some recent systems [69, 70] that uti-
lize online games as the cover application manage to achieve
lower latency, but the issue with low goodput remains, and
additional processing to extract CRS traffic from the cover
medium adds to latency. Some systems might have high stor-
age requirements if the server has to maintain a collection of
cover media to embed CRS traffic.
There exist only six publication-centric systems, which
appeared in early 2000s, with only two cases where a tool
is available; focus has shifted to access-centric schemes, with
properties traditionally associated with secure publication be-
ing offered by content delivery networks. Publication-centric
schemes have the goal to increase availability of the informa-
tion they store, while offering publishers and participants de-
niability. Existing approaches to protect documents from re-
moval include replication of documents across multiple partic-
ipants, typically individual volunteers with participation po-
tentially conditioned on the bandwidth or storage they are will-
ing to offer. Another approach to increase document availabil-
ity is to create dependence between multiple documents by
intertwining them with each other. In the former case, the cen-
sor has to invest additional resources to remove a document,
while in the latter case removing a document results in collat-
eral damage as other intertwined documents are also deleted.
While most publication-centric schemes provide publisher au-
thentication, document integrity and privacy properties, a ma-
jor limitation is that the protocol messages are observable
which makes it possible for the censor to disrupt the CRS. By
design, publication-centric schemes tend to be asynchronous,
and provide partial coverage; allowing access to static docu-
ments, typically with no restriction on size. Stability of these
schemes depends on the time it takes to find requested infor-
mation.
7 Open Areas and Research
Challenges
We provided a comparative evaluation of existing censorship
resistance approaches, to characterize their suitability to dif-
ferent censorship models (security and privacy properties), use
cases (performance properties), and deployability scenarios. In
a broader context, this evaluation has highlighted a number of
open areas and challenges, as described below.
7.1 Modular System Design
Our evaluation of various CRS schemes (Sections 5.5 and 6.3)
suggests that it may be possible to increase coverage of de-
sirable security and privacy properties by combining comple-
mentary CRSs. In many situations having several schemes in
operation is more effective than using any one [71] (for ex-
ample, Tor dealt with TLS handshake fingerprinting of Jan-
uary and September 2011 by modifying its protocol to protect
against the vulnerable attack path).
However, this is not straight forward as most censorship
resistance systems have been designed to be stand-alone sys-
tems with tightly integrated functionality. Even designs that
share a common base, e.g. the Tor network and the various
pluggable transports (CRS systems that can interface with Tor
in a plug-and-play fashion [72]), suffer from this problem. Al-
though the Tor community is actively trying to address this
problem with the pluggable transport framework [73], the de-
sired level of modularity and composability within pluggable
transports themselves are not currently in place [5, 74]. Jump-
box alleviates, but does not solve, the problem at the network
interface layer, by providing a standard interface for encapsu-
lating CRS traffic to look like regular web traffic [75].
There has been some effort in the context of Tor to com-
bine pluggable transports, however, this has happened not in
a black-box way, but through the sharing of source code.
LibFTE is in use by Tor (in its fteproxy Pluggable Trans-
port form) and a number of other projects [76]. Similarly,
Meek [77] which was originally developed for Tor now also
exists in a fork by Psiphon [78] with minor adaptations. Fog
uses multiple proxies to chain Pluggable Transports in a black
box fashion [79]. This approach is not suitable for practical
deployment due to a number of limitations. For example, not
all combinations of pluggable transports make sense: the chain
obfs3 [80] (flow fingerprinting resistance) followed by Flash-
proxy [49] (IP address filtering resistance) offers more com-
prehensive resistance, but the reverse, i.e. Flashproxy followed
by obfs3 breaks the former’s network layer assumptions. Khat-
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tak et al. provide a coarse framework to build access-centric
CRSs out of reusable components [5].
Another challenge is that CRS designs are typically forced
to make a trade-off between security and performance. Com-
bining CRSs to create a hybrid is likely to come at a perfor-
mance cost. For example, a CRS that tunnels traffic through
a popular content provider can be combined with a CRS that
redirects traffic through multiple proxies to provide anonymity
may provide greater security and privacy, but performance will
be poor due to the tunnelling protocol’s network overhead,
combined with multi-hop routing employed by the second
CRS. However, there might be cases where the hybrid’s per-
formance profile remains the same, such as the combination of
a publication-centric CRS (e.g. Tangler [63]) with an access-
centric scheme that uses covert channel to store CRS content
on popular platforms (e.g. Collage [59]): the CRS user can use
covert channel to send its request to the CRS server, which can
then serve the requested information the usual way. Internally,
the CRS can replicate information over multiple CRS servers
for high availability and allow publishers to deniably post in-
formation to the CRS. This kind of hybrid is effective for use
cases that must already allow for performance compromises,
while prioritizing security properties.
7.2 Revisiting Common Assumptions
Our study of the literature (Tables 1 and 2) suggests that nearly
all CRSs assume that increasing cost to block (collateral dam-
age) and placing servers and facilitators outside the censor’s
sphere of influence will lead to unblockability. However, as
we note below, these assumptions do not always hold.
While existing CRS schemes are contingent on and try to
maximize collateral damage incurred by the censor in terms
of false positives, they do not evaluate the impact of false
negatives on censor’s behaviour, nor identify parameters that
might affect it. Filling this gap is an important next step in
illuminating the dynamics of the censorship resistance game
and providing feedback on best practices for CRS design. In-
deed, we are beginning to see activity in this vein in recent
work by Tschantz et al. [48] and Elahi et al. [81]. The latter
specifically pursues the last two areas of research, by applying
game-theoretic analysis to censorship resistance and investi-
gating the impact of information leakage, collateral damage,
and accuracy of the censorship apparatus on the censor’s be-
haviour.
Another common CRS strategy is to resist the censor’s
fingerprinting efforts by mitigating perceived low-cost distin-
guishers. However, the capabilities and willingness of the cen-
sor to engage in sophisticated traffic analysis is unclear, and
the cost of detecting complex high-cost distinguishers is not
well understood. While it is difficult to find out the true capa-
bilities of a censor, it is still useful to assess the cost to censor
in employing lower- and higher-hanging distinguishers. While
the literature does analyze detection attacks, these analyses are
usually implementation specific, and as such the results are of
limited scope and do not tell us if they are applicable to relate
to a realistic censor. A recent study notes that the threat mod-
els employed by most existing CRSs are disconnected from
how real censors operate, e.g. real censors tend to avoid at-
tacks involving packet dropping to avoid the collateral damage
of blocking allowed connections [6]. Such studies help explain
why mimicry and tunnelling-based schemes continue to be ef-
fective in practice, despite theoretical attacks that demonstrate
their vulnerability to active manipulation [64, 65] (Section 6).
Similarly, a number of systems protect against a censor capa-
ble of fingerprinting flow properties and content; evaluation of
such systems will greatly benefit from a repository of traffic
capture files. Systems that perform traffic shaping use various
protocols in a ‘correct’ manner and require labelled datasets
against which to validate their schemes. Adversary Lab [82]
has done some preliminary work on developing a standard en-
vironment to evaluate systems resistant to flow fingerprinting
by subjecting them to a range of adversaries. There is a need
for Internet-scale studies of distinguisher effectiveness, which
may provide clues about which distinguishers are of the high-
est utility to the censor and the biggest threats to the CRS.
All CRSs rely on some CRS components being located
outside the censor’s sphere of influence. However, recent
revelations, in particular those by Edward Snowden [83],
call these design choices into question. The alarming reach
of “Five Eyes”—a program of cooperation and surveillance
data sharing between the governments of Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
necessitates a reevaluation of the basic assumptions most
CRSs make with respect to the censor’s sphere of influence
and visibility. Systems are typically not designed to with-
stand global passive adversaries, for instance, and designs of-
ten count on distribution across diverse jurisdictions to make
this assumption realistic. Given that a significant number of
government entities cooperate and have far-reaching network
capabilities, systems designed with these assumptions may be
more brittle than previously believed. While it is unclear just
how large the spheres of visibility and influence are for any
given censor, their reach is likely far larger than anticipated by
current CRS designs.
7.3 Security Gaps
Our analysis in Sections 5.5 and 6.3 reveals certain gaps in
the security provided by CRS schemes. First, there are no ef-
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fective countermeasures against the censor poisoning CRS in-
formation (corrupt routing information in Section 2.4). Any
public information used by both CRS and non-CRS activities,
however, has at least an implicit level of defense, since it is not
without risk for the censor to poison such information.
Second, most CRSs are not completely immune to denial-
of-service attacks on key CRS components and resources [84].
The CRS implicitly depends on capabilities of participant(s) or
the network connectivity provider hosting dissemination and
CRS servers to prevent such attacks. However, this is a broader
security issue; denial-of-service attacks do not yet have a ro-
bust solution, outside of over-provisioning of bandwidth and
IP addresses.
Third, corrupted content and malicious CRS participants
are not adequately defended against and is an area of active re-
search [28, 64]. At present, the primary work to address these
problems is in the Tor ecosystem. The poisoning of the public
relay information, such as IP addresses and port numbers, is
mitigated using digital signature schemes, but protecting the
authenticity and confidentiality (from the censor) of bridge
addresses is an outstanding problem. There have been many
denial-of-service attacks, both theoretical and actual, on the
Tor network; these have been addressed on a case-by-case ba-
sis through programmatic changes. Finally, the Tor network
actively attempts to detect suspicious relays through various
network-level tests, but this is done in an ad-hoc fashion.
7.4 Considerations for Participation
We note that most schemes in Communication Establishment
(Table 1), and some schemes in Conversation (Table 2) re-
cruit individual entities who volunteer to help based on qual-
itative incentivization, usually goodwill. We note that most
schemes treat participation as a binary decision, where partici-
pants lack the ability to control the degree of cooperation (e.g.
bandwidth, number of connections, or users). Indeed, in most
schemes it is not even clear what is the cost of participation.
These issues may act as a deterrent to wide-scale adoption. A
possible mitigation is to enforce a lower threshold on partic-
ipation and give participants the flexibility to switch between
higher values and the threshold. For example, some systems,
such as Tor [46] and Tangler [63], demand a minimum amount
of bandwidth or storage from participants, which they can con-
figure to higher values if desired.
Our study highlights an increasing trend among CRSs
to leverage existing, popular commercial services as partic-
ipants; this is particularly true of mimicry, tunnelling and
covert channel-based schemes which represent 32 of the to-
tal 73 CRSs surveyed. (Table 2). We note that such imple-
mentations meet CRS design goals through happy, and pos-
sibly temporary, coincidence. As a result, there are extrinsic
properties we must account for when evaluating such CRSs,
which may be undesirable even in the absence of the censor’s
active interference. First, such a design has dependencies on
external parties who may not be invested in the CRS’s suc-
cess. Second, the properties for which the CRS leverages the
commercial party do not exist by its own design, implying that
there may be unexpected states that render the CRS ineffec-
tive, or the desired functionality may simply disappear with an
update or for commercial reasons. For example, Skype used
to have super nodes (special nodes with high bandwidth and
stability, that relayed traffic between Skype users), but these
were phased out in 2013 for scalability reasons. This affected
mimicry-based CRSs (e.g.SkypeMorph [57]) that leveraged
Skype’s super nodes to obfuscate IP addresses of CRS users,
thereby providing privacy.
A primary motivation for CRSs to entwine their activi-
ties with popular commercial parties is the assumption that the
censor is unable to accurately extract CRS activity from the
commercial party, and will refrain from wholesale blocking
of the commercial party due to high collateral damage. Effec-
tively the CRS causes the commercial party to act as a con-
centration point for maximizing collateral damage incurred by
the censor. Counterintuitively, the censor may actually bene-
fit from this concentration, since the attack surfaces and CRS
security failures are also concentrated and well defined, e.g.
CloudTransport [85] uses only traffic to Amazon’s cloud stor-
age and hence potentially easier to contain.
A related issue is that the CRS can be rendered ineffective
if the censor develops local alternatives for commercial parties
leveraged by the CRS and forces users in its sphere of influ-
ence to use them. Finally, commercial participants are often
operated by single corporations; the censor can strike back at
the CRS by attacking the platform and/or the entity that oper-
ates it. The strike can be in the form of actual network-level
attacks [86] that cause the operator to reconsider or decry [87]
its role as a host to CRS activity. Indeed, there is uncertainty
around exactly how the operating entity may respond. In the
worst case it may even act as an informant to the censor and
monitor CRS activity.
8 Related Work
The literature contains a number of surveys, taxonomies, and
reports that analyze censorship resistance, their varying goals,
scopes, and technical depth. While the present study extends
previous work in many ways, we believe its value lies in cap-
turing breadth of the entire field of censorship resistance, while
also providing sufficient technical details.
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Elahi and Goldberg sketch the censor’s attack model,
and present a taxonomy of censorship resistance strategies
for different types of censors (e.g. ISP, government) with the
decision-making process based on their resources, capabili-
ties, limitations, and utility [4]. Our work extends this work
by providing more technical depth and rigorous systematiza-
tion methodology.
Khattak et al. focus exclusively on pluggable trans-
ports [72], a framework to allow access-centric CRSs to flexi-
bly plug into a larger system like Tor [5]. They represent func-
tionality of a CRS that protects the link between CRS client
and CRS server as a layered stack, and discuss threats and mit-
igations relevant to each layer. Their model of pluggable trans-
ports mirrors our own in that they are also concerned with dis-
ruption of access to information; however, our scope includes
the entire CRS landscape including publishers and CRS partic-
ipants, and issues surrounding communication establishment.
In a more recent work, Tschantz et al. conduct an exten-
sive survey of evaluation criteria used by CRSs, and compare
these to the behaviour of real censors as reported in field re-
ports and popular bug tickets [6]. They find a significant dis-
connect between the threat models employed in theoretical
evaluations, and how censors operate in practice. While their
enumeration of criteria used by CRSs has some overlap with
the security, privacy, performance, and deployability proper-
ties we use in our systematization, the study has different goals
to ours: we evaluate underlying CRS approaches, while they
exhaustively enumerate evaluation criteria employed by CRSs
to identify trends, and how these relate to real world censors.
The above work is most closely related to our study.
We now discuss other studies that are generally relevant to
ours. Köpsell and Hillig present a classification of block-
ing techniques based on the communication layer involved
(TCP/IP), the content of communication (e.g. images, web)
and metadata of the communication (e.g. IP addresses of par-
ticipants, time of the communication, protocols involved) [88].
Leberknight et al. survey the social, political, and techni-
cal aspects that underpin censorship. They also propose met-
rics that quantify their efficacy, i.e. scale, cost, and gran-
ularity [89]. Perng et al. classify circumvention systems
based on the technical primitives and principles they build
upon [90]. Tschantz et al. argue that the evaluation of cir-
cumvention tools should be based on economic models of
censorship [48]. Gardner presents a non-technical document
on freedom-supporting technologies, describing their mainte-
nance and funding ecosystem, user demographics, their impact
and the factors governing their development and usage [91].
9 Conclusion
As the importance of the Internet to effectively engage in civil
society continues to grow, so does the desire of various actors
to control the flow of information, and censor communications
which are considered undesirable. A number of censorship re-
sistance systems (CRSs) have emerged to help bypass such
blocks. The interplay between these two actors with contrast-
ing goals has given rise to an arms race, as a result of which
the field has grown increasingly complex.
In this work we presented a comprehensive censor’s attack
model and established evaluation framework for measuring se-
curity, privacy, performance and deployability of CRSs. We
provided a comparative evaluation of existing censorship resis-
tance approaches, while emphasizing their strengths and limi-
tations. In a broader context, our study has highlighted a num-
ber of open areas and challenges: (i) combining CRSs may
increase coverage of desirable security and privacy properties,
but doing so in a meaningful way without breaking other oper-
ational assumptions is challenging; (ii) common CRS assump-
tions regarding the censor’s sphere of influence, and blocking
cost to censor should be reevaluated in the light of evolving
sociopolitical dynamics; (iii) there are outstanding security is-
sues that CRSs cannot yet effectively mitigate, such as denial
of service attacks, corruption of information that supports CRS
(e.g. DNS poisoning), and malicious CRS participants; (iv) re-
cruitment of volunteer participants should be at least partially
regularized for better system stability and scalability; further-
more, the growing trend for CRSs to rely on powerful, com-
mercial participants to increase collateral damage associated
with blocking can potentially act as a single point of failure
from a security and privacy standpoint. We hope that our work
on contextualizing the area of censorship resistance and the re-
search gaps identified will inform future research endeavours.
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Table 3. Surveyed systems relevant to different schemes of Communication Establishment; † Academic paper, ? Deployed.
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Table 4. Surveyed systems relevant to different schemes of Conversation; † Academic paper, ? Deployed.
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